Your Crypto Trading Bot Can Lose Money Without Withdrawal Access

Digital Vibe 18 min read
crypto

A crypto trading bot does not need withdrawal permission to cause substantial losses.

That risk came into focus after SignalPlus said an attacker compromised its systems, leading to unauthorized trading activity and $81,897 in losses across 23 users.

The company said all identified users were reimbursed within 72 hours.

Binance and Deribit also revoked API keys linked to SignalPlus as a precaution, even though both exchanges said their own systems had not been compromised.

The incident highlights a security issue that can be easy to overlook: an outside trading platform may be unable to withdraw funds from an exchange but still have enough authority to change the assets in an account, open positions, incur trading fees and trigger liquidations.

SignalPlus traces attack to fake Microsoft Teams invitation

SignalPlus said the intrusion began outside the exchanges where customers kept their funds.

According to the company, an attacker first compromised the Telegram account of a contact at one of SignalPlus’s technology vendors.

The attacker then used that trusted identity to approach a SignalPlus engineer.

A fake Microsoft Teams meeting invitation was reportedly sent through the compromised Telegram account.

Engineer’s computer was compromised

SignalPlus said the fake invitation led to the engineer’s device being compromised.

The attacker remained on the computer and later used the employee’s access privileges to target SignalPlus’s internal network.

The company detected unusual activity during the early hours of November 4.

It then began investigating and said it blocked the intrusion and closed the vulnerabilities it had identified.

Exchange API connections became part of the response

SignalPlus provides trading infrastructure for crypto options and derivatives.

Customers connect exchange accounts to the platform using API credentials.

Those API keys allow SignalPlus software to perform approved actions without requiring the user to log into the exchange and manually confirm every order.

Because the compromised company had access to customer trading credentials, isolating the employee’s computer was not enough.

Binance revoked SignalPlus-linked API keys

Binance said on November 5 that it removed all API keys connected to SignalPlus.

The exchange described the action as precautionary.

It said Binance’s own systems had not been affected and customer funds remained safe within the exchange.

However, customers were told to inspect their open orders and positions directly through Binance.

Deribit took similar action

Deribit also revoked API keys linked to SignalPlus.

Like Binance, it said it had found no evidence that its own infrastructure or data had been compromised.

The exchange warned that removing the credentials would stop SignalPlus trading, monitoring and automation.

Customers could still access their accounts directly through Deribit.

SignalPlus paused services

SignalPlus also placed its own services into maintenance while investigating the incident.

That meant customers who normally relied on the platform to monitor or manage positions suddenly had to work directly through their exchanges.

The precaution applied even to users whose accounts did not show unusual activity.

Revoking a trading API key does not undo completed trades

This is one of the most important lessons from the incident.

Revoking an API key stops the credential from submitting future requests.

It does not reverse trades that have already executed.

It also does not automatically cancel every order that has already been accepted by an exchange.

Open orders can remain after the bot disconnects

Suppose a bot submits a limit order.

The exchange accepts it.

Then the API key is revoked.

The order may still remain active on the exchange until it:

  • Executes
  • Is manually canceled
  • Expires under exchange rules

Removing the credential that submitted the order does not necessarily remove the order itself.

Existing derivatives positions keep moving

The same is true for open futures or options positions.

If a bot opens a leveraged trade and then loses access, the position does not disappear.

It can continue gaining or losing value.

Margin requirements still apply.

A sufficiently adverse move can result in liquidation even after the bot has been disconnected.

A bot does not need withdrawal access to lose money

Many traders assume that disabling withdrawals makes a third-party API connection relatively safe.

That is only partly true.

It prevents one straightforward attack route: transferring crypto out of the exchange.

But a trading credential can still damage the account through market activity.

Trading permissions can change what the customer owns

A bot with trading authority may be able to:

  • Buy assets
  • Sell assets
  • Open derivatives positions
  • Close positions
  • Place repeated orders

The assets can remain entirely inside the exchange while the account still loses value.

A losing trade requires no withdrawal

Imagine a bot buys an asset at $100.

The price falls to $70.

No crypto was transferred externally.

But the account has still suffered a 30% loss on the position.

The same can happen if a bot sells an asset immediately before it rallies.

Trading also creates fees

Every trade can create costs.

Depending on the venue and order type, these can include:

  • Exchange fees
  • Bid-ask spreads
  • Slippage
  • Funding costs
  • Liquidation charges

A bot executing many trades can accumulate meaningful costs even if the strategy itself is roughly flat.

Trading volume can exceed account size many times over

A bot can reuse the same capital repeatedly.

A $10,000 balance might generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in trading volume over time.

Fees are usually charged against trading activity, not simply the original deposit.

That means frequent unauthorized activity can erode an account even without a single withdrawal.

Leverage makes trading access more dangerous

The risk becomes significantly larger when the connected account supports leveraged derivatives.

A credential that can open futures positions may expose a relatively small amount of collateral to much larger notional positions.

An attacker does not need to steal the balance directly.

They can create a position that loses it.

Liquidation can convert unauthorized trading into a major loss

Suppose an account has $20,000 in collateral.

A compromised bot opens a heavily leveraged position.

The market moves against it.

The exchange can liquidate the position automatically.

The assets never leave the exchange through a normal withdrawal, yet a large portion of the account can disappear through trading losses.

Withdrawal permissions and trading permissions solve different problems

Exchange API systems usually separate these permissions intentionally.

Kraken, for example, describes third-party trading services as typically needing order permissions but not withdrawal permissions.

Coinbase also distinguishes between Trade permissions and Transfer permissions.

That separation reduces risk.

It does not eliminate trading risk.

Valid API authentication can still represent unauthorized activity

From the exchange’s perspective, a compromised API key may look technically valid.

The request contains the credential that the customer previously authorized.

The exchange cannot automatically know that an attacker rather than the legitimate trading service is now using it.

This is why protecting API credentials is critical.

SignalPlus attack targeted a trusted third party

The SignalPlus incident illustrates another important point.

The attacker did not need to compromise Binance or Deribit directly.

Customers had already authorized SignalPlus to manage part of their exchange accounts.

The attacker instead compromised the trusted service sitting between the customer and exchange.

That created a path into account functions without breaching the exchange itself.

Third-party integrations expand the security perimeter

Connecting an exchange account to external software means users are trusting more than the exchange.

They are also trusting:

  • The bot provider
  • Its employees
  • Its servers
  • Its internal access controls
  • Its API-key storage
  • Its vendors
  • Its software update processes

Every additional layer can become a potential point of failure.

SignalPlus says 23 users were affected

The company initially estimated total losses below $82,000.

In a November 8 update, SignalPlus said 23 identified users had suffered losses totaling $81,897.

The company said it completed reimbursement for those users within 72 hours of detecting the attack.

Reimbursement does not end the security issue

Paying affected users addresses the financial loss identified by the provider.

It does not by itself fix the underlying security weaknesses.

SignalPlus said it continued its investigation while strengthening internal systems and preparing a phased restoration of services.

SignalPlus acknowledged an IP-whitelisting gap

The company said it had not made IP whitelisting mandatory for exchange API connections.

SignalPlus called that omission an oversight.

Accounts identified as affected did not have the protection enabled, according to its initial disclosure.

What does IP whitelisting do?

An IP whitelist restricts where an API credential can be used.

For example, a trading key could be configured so the exchange accepts requests only from a small set of SignalPlus server addresses.

If an attacker steals the key and tries to use it from another address, the request can be rejected.

IP restrictions protect trading requests, not just withdrawals

This control is different from a withdrawal allowlist.

A withdrawal allowlist limits which blockchain addresses can receive funds.

An IP whitelist limits where an API request can originate.

Both controls can be useful, but they protect against different threats.

IP whitelisting is not perfect

If the attacker compromises infrastructure that is already on the approved IP list, the restriction may not help.

That is why SignalPlus announced changes beyond IP controls.

The company also said it would strengthen:

  • Employee device security
  • Internal access controls
  • Key management
  • Threat intelligence

Layered security remains necessary.

Employee-device security mattered in this attack

According to SignalPlus, the intrusion began when an engineer’s computer was compromised.

That made workstation security directly relevant to customer account risk.

A company can have strong exchange API controls but still face problems if attackers obtain privileged employee access.

Vendor impersonation is a serious attack vector

The attacker reportedly used a compromised Telegram account belonging to a real vendor contact.

That gave the phishing attempt credibility.

The engineer did not simply receive a random message from an unknown person.

The communication appeared to come from someone already trusted.

Trusted accounts can make phishing harder to detect

Traditional phishing advice often says not to trust unexpected messages from strangers.

Compromised contact accounts defeat part of that defense.

A message can come from the correct username and still be malicious.

Users and employees may therefore need to verify sensitive requests through a second communication channel.

Fake meeting invitations can deliver malware

Meeting invitations have become a common social-engineering technique.

Attackers may send links pretending to lead to:

  • Microsoft Teams
  • Zoom
  • Google Meet
  • Other collaboration tools

The target may instead be directed toward malware, a fake login page or a malicious installer.

API keys should be treated like passwords

Exchange API credentials can provide substantial account access.

They should therefore be treated as sensitive secrets.

Users should not:

  • Post them in screenshots
  • Send them through unsecured messages
  • Store them in public repositories
  • Reuse them unnecessarily

A QR code containing an API credential can be just as sensitive as the text itself.

Hiding the text but exposing the QR code is not enough

A user may blur an API key in a screenshot while leaving its QR code visible.

That can still reveal the credential.

Security reviews need to treat all encoded forms of the key as sensitive.

API permissions should follow the principle of least privilege

A service should receive only the access it actually needs.

A portfolio tracker may need read-only permission.

It does not need trading access.

A trading bot may need order permission.

It usually does not need withdrawals.

The smaller the permission set, the smaller the potential damage after compromise.

Read-only integrations are much safer

A reporting tool that only retrieves balances cannot normally place orders.

That means an attacker compromising the service has fewer ways to damage the account.

Users should avoid granting trade permissions to applications that only need analytics.

Account segmentation can reduce exposure

Some exchanges allow API credentials to be limited to specific portfolios or subaccounts.

This can be a powerful risk-control tool.

Rather than giving a bot access to the trader’s entire exchange balance, users can isolate a smaller amount in a dedicated account.

Bot allocation settings may not be real exchange limits

This distinction is critical.

A trading bot might display:

“Allocated capital: $5,000.”

But if the underlying API credential can trade a $100,000 exchange account, the $5,000 figure may be enforced only by the bot’s own software.

If the bot is compromised, that application-level limit may no longer protect the remaining funds.

Exchange-side restrictions are stronger

A limit enforced by the exchange itself is harder for compromised third-party software to bypass.

Useful controls can include:

  • Separate subaccounts
  • Limited portfolios
  • IP whitelists
  • Disabled withdrawals
  • Reduced margin access

These restrictions exist outside the bot’s own interface.

Check whether margin permissions are enabled

Users should also understand whether a trading credential can access leveraged products.

A bot limited to spot trading presents a different risk from one able to open futures positions.

Margin access can multiply potential losses.

Login security does not automatically protect an API key

A user may secure an exchange login with:

  • A strong password
  • Two-factor authentication
  • Hardware security keys

Those controls protect interactive sign-in.

An API key uses a separate authentication process.

A stolen API credential may continue working without asking for the user’s normal 2FA code.

API 2FA support varies

Some platforms offer additional authentication protections for API keys.

Support depends on the exchange and the application using the credential.

Users should check which security features are actually supported by their chosen trading software.

Expiring API keys can reduce long-term exposure

Some exchanges allow API credentials to expire automatically.

That can reduce the risk created by forgotten integrations.

However, expiry must be managed carefully.

If the key stops working while a bot is managing open positions, those positions can remain active.

Key rotation should include revoking the old key

Creating a replacement API credential is not enough.

The previous credential should also be revoked.

Otherwise, users simply end up with two active secrets instead of one.

Old keys that are no longer needed should be removed.

Deleting a trading-bot account may not revoke exchange access

Canceling a subscription to an external service does not necessarily remove its API key from the exchange.

The exchange issued the credential.

Users may need to log into the exchange directly and revoke it there.

This is an important part of disconnecting third-party applications safely.

Earlier 3Commas incident showed similar risks

SignalPlus is not the first case in which third-party trading credentials became a security problem.

In 2022, users of trading-bot platform 3Commas reported unauthorized activity across connected exchange accounts.

Some complaints involved large numbers of trades rather than simple external withdrawals.

3Commas eventually acknowledged leaked API keys

By late December 2022, 3Commas acknowledged that API keys published by a hacker were valid.

Exchange users were advised to revoke affected credentials.

The case demonstrated that API-key compromise can affect accounts across multiple venues when the same third-party service connects to several exchanges.

Exchange security and third-party security are separate

An exchange can remain secure while a connected service is compromised.

Those statements are not contradictory.

The exchange protects custody and its own infrastructure.

The third-party provider controls another authorized route into selected account functions.

Both layers need to be secure.

Withdrawal history may miss the real loss

If users only look at withdrawals, an API trading attack can be easy to misunderstand.

The withdrawal history may show that no assets left the account.

But the portfolio may now hold completely different assets or be worth much less.

Trading history and position records are therefore essential during an API incident.

Exchange records are the source of truth after a bot outage

If a third-party platform loses connection, its dashboard can become outdated.

The exchange itself maintains the final record of:

  • Filled orders
  • Partial fills
  • Open orders
  • Positions
  • Balances

Users should check the exchange directly rather than assuming the bot accurately reflects the current account state.

Partial fills need attention too

An order might have been partially executed before the API connection was disabled.

That can leave the account with both:

  • A new position
  • A remaining open order

Users should inspect both.

Stop-loss orders may exist only inside the bot

Some trading bots implement stop-loss rules locally.

The bot watches the market and submits the sell order only when the trigger is reached.

If the software disconnects, that protection can disappear.

An exchange-hosted stop order is different because the exchange already holds the instruction.

Users should know where risk controls actually live

A dashboard saying “stop loss: 5%” does not prove the exchange itself has received the order.

The protection may exist only inside the bot.

During an outage or compromise, that distinction becomes extremely important.

Dead-man switches can help with pending orders

Some exchanges offer automated cancellation tools often called dead-man switches.

An automated client periodically sends a signal to keep orders alive.

If the exchange stops receiving that signal, it cancels covered orders after a set time.

This can reduce exposure when a bot suddenly disconnects.

Dead-man switches cannot reverse completed trades

They can cancel pending orders.

They cannot:

  • Undo filled orders
  • Restore previous balances
  • Reverse liquidations
  • Close every existing position automatically

They are one layer of protection, not a complete solution.

Multi-exchange bots require multi-exchange cleanup

A user may connect one trading interface to Binance, Deribit, Kraken and other venues.

Each exchange issues its own API credentials.

Revoking the Binance key does not disable the others.

Users responding to a provider compromise need to inspect every connected exchange.

CZ urged users to revoke keys on other venues too

Binance founder Changpeng Zhao publicly advised SignalPlus users to revoke related API credentials on other exchanges as well.

That warning reflects the multi-platform nature of third-party trading tools.

One compromised provider can represent risk across several accounts.

SignalPlus says all exchange partners were contacted

The company said it asked partner exchanges to suspend associated keys as part of its response.

The service itself was also paused.

That broad shutdown aimed to remove access quickly rather than wait until every customer individually reported suspicious activity.

No unusual activity does not mean no disruption

Users whose accounts were unaffected still lost the automated services they relied on.

That is a normal trade-off during incident containment.

Disabling all connections can inconvenience unaffected customers while reducing the chance of additional losses.

Reimbursement covered identified unauthorized activity

SignalPlus said it reimbursed $81,897 across 23 users.

That number refers to losses the company identified and compensated.

Customers who believed they had suffered other losses were told to submit their exchange records to official support for review.

Compensation and ongoing market losses are separate

A reimbursed customer could still have an open position after the incident.

That position could continue gaining or losing money.

The reimbursement therefore does not necessarily restore the account to exactly the state it would have had without the breach.

This is another reason users needed to review exchange positions directly.

SignalPlus plans a phased service restoration

The company said services would return gradually after security reviews and upgrades were completed.

Users were advised to wait for official confirmation before reconnecting API keys.

New connections are expected to use stronger access controls.

What traders should do before connecting a bot

Before authorizing a third-party platform, users should check several things.

Permissions:
Grant only the minimum access required.

Withdrawals:
Keep them disabled unless absolutely necessary.

IP whitelist:
Restrict requests to known provider infrastructure when supported.

Subaccount isolation:
Use a dedicated portfolio with limited funds.

Leverage:
Avoid unnecessary margin permissions.

Expiry:
Use reasonable credential expiration where practical.

What to do after a bot provider reports a breach

The response should begin at the exchange.

Revoke the API key:
Stop the compromised service from submitting new requests.

Check every connected exchange:
Each venue has a separate credential.

Review open orders:
Cancel instructions you no longer want.

Review positions:
Manage any futures, options or spot exposure left behind.

Check trade history:
Look for unauthorized fills.

Generate replacement credentials only after the provider is safe:
Do not immediately reconnect to a compromised service.

Do not focus only on withdrawals

A withdrawal list can look completely clean while an account has suffered serious losses.

For API incidents, users should review:

  • Orders
  • Fills
  • Positions
  • Fees
  • Funding
  • Liquidations
  • Asset balances

That provides a much more complete picture.

What to watch next

SignalPlus restoration:
Users should look for dated notices confirming which services are back online and what security checks were completed.

Additional affected accounts:
Further transaction reviews could change the number of identified users or total losses.

Mandatory IP controls:
Stronger whitelisting requirements could become a permanent part of the platform’s API setup.

Exchange safeguards:
Venues may introduce tighter controls around third-party API integrations.

Provider security:
SignalPlus’s employee-device and internal access improvements will be important in preventing another intrusion.

Final thoughts

The SignalPlus incident demonstrates why “withdrawals disabled” should never be interpreted as “funds cannot be lost.”

A trading API can be powerful even when it cannot send cryptocurrency to an external address.

It can change portfolio holdings, place repeated orders, incur fees, create leveraged positions and expose an account to liquidation.

SignalPlus says the intrusion began with a fake meeting invitation sent through a compromised vendor contact, eventually giving an attacker access to an engineer’s computer and internal systems.

Binance and Deribit responded by revoking SignalPlus-linked API credentials, while SignalPlus ultimately reimbursed 23 identified users for a total of $81,897.

For traders, the broader security lesson is to treat API keys as financial credentials.

Disable unnecessary permissions, use exchange-side restrictions, isolate bot capital from larger holdings, enable IP whitelisting where possible and always check the exchange directly after a third-party service suffers an outage or breach.

A bot does not need to withdraw your crypto to lose your money.

Disclosure: This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.

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