Two separate DeFi security incidents have resulted in combined losses of nearly $3.9 million across Ethereum and Polygon.
Blockchain security firm Blockaid said attackers drained approximately $3.43 million from K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault on Ethereum and another $454,000 from Reental-related smart contracts on Polygon.
The attacks used different methods.
K3 Capital’s incident involved manipulating vault share valuations through flash loans and liquidations, while the Reental exploit followed an administrative smart contract upgrade that reportedly allowed underlying stablecoins to be drained.
Both incidents were described as ongoing when Blockaid published its alerts.
K3 Capital loses about $3.43 million from sBOLD vault
The larger of the two exploits targeted K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault.
Blockaid said attackers drained roughly $3.43 million across about 34 Ethereum transactions.
The attack involved a vault connected to Liquity V2, a decentralized borrowing protocol built around the BOLD stablecoin.
sBOLD is a yield-generating third-party vault
sBOLD is operated by K3 Capital rather than Liquity’s core development team.
Users deposit BOLD into the vault and receive sBOLD shares representing a proportional interest in the assets under management.
The vault automatically reinvests returns from Liquity V2 stability pools.
Those returns can come from:
- Interest paid by borrowers
- Collateral acquired through liquidations
That structure makes accurate vault valuation critical.
Attackers reportedly manipulated liquidation accounting
According to Blockaid, the attackers used flash-loaned wrapped staked ether, or wstETH, as part of the exploit.
They then reportedly self-liquidated a Liquity V2 trove into the stability pools.
The process manipulated how the vault valued its assets and shares.
Blockaid said the attackers were able to mint sBOLD shares at artificially low valuations.
Cheap shares were then used to extract other depositors’ BOLD
After obtaining underpriced sBOLD shares, the attackers allegedly swapped the collateral and redeemed assets belonging to other depositors.
That is what turned the valuation issue into a direct financial loss.
The mechanism effectively allowed the attackers to buy into the vault too cheaply and withdraw more value than they should have been entitled to receive.
Flash loans amplified the attack
Flash loans allow traders to borrow large amounts of capital within a single transaction as long as the loan is repaid before that transaction completes.
They are not malicious by themselves.
But they can give attackers enough temporary capital to manipulate:
- Prices
- Collateral
- Liquidations
- Accounting assumptions
That makes them a common tool in DeFi exploits.
Self-liquidation appears central to the exploit
The attack reportedly involved the attackers liquidating their own position.
That matters because self-liquidation can be used to influence the collateral entering a stability pool.
If a vault does not correctly account for the value of that collateral, share pricing can become distorted.
That appears to be the core issue Blockaid identified.
Earlier audit had already examined a similar risk
A May 2025 ChainSecurity audit of sBOLD identified a high-severity accounting issue involving collateral received through liquidations.
The auditors found that an earlier version of the vault could undervalue shares after liquidation events.
That could have allowed malicious users to extract value from existing depositors.
ChainSecurity had marked the issue as fixed
The audit later classified the finding as corrected.
The software was changed so collateral held by the vault would be included when calculating its value.
ChainSecurity wrote that the possibility of extracting value through self-liquidations had been mitigated.
That makes the latest exploit especially important.
It is not yet clear whether the old issue returned
The available information does not establish whether the November exploit used the exact same vulnerability identified in 2025.
It could involve:
- A regression
- A different accounting edge case
- A separate flaw in the same general area
Until a full post-mortem is released, linking the incidents directly would be premature.
The 2025 audit found multiple serious issues
ChainSecurity’s assessment identified:
- 2 critical findings
- 3 high-severity findings
- 8 medium-severity findings
All were listed as corrected during the audit process.
A separate assessment by Dedaub also reviewed risks involving BOLD market liquidity and valuation.
Audits reduce risk, but do not eliminate it
The incident highlights one of the persistent realities of DeFi security.
A protocol can be audited and still be exploited later.
Possible reasons include:
- New code changes
- Integration assumptions
- Market behavior not fully modeled
- Previously unknown edge cases
- Fixes that create new interactions
An audit is evidence of review, not a guarantee of safety.
Liquity says K3 Capital operates sBOLD independently
Liquity’s documentation identifies sBOLD as a third-party product developed and maintained by K3 Capital.
That distinction matters for responsibility.
The exploit targeted the K3-operated vault rather than Liquity V2 itself, based on the information reported.
Users should therefore distinguish between the underlying Liquity protocol and third-party vault products built on top of it.
K3 Capital had not responded by press time
The source states that crypto.news contacted K3 Capital for comment.
No response had been received by press time.
That means the technical explanation currently relies heavily on Blockaid’s analysis and earlier audit documentation.
Reental loses approximately $454,000 on Polygon
A separate incident targeted Reental.
Blockaid reported approximately $454,000 in losses involving smart contracts on Polygon.
The attack involved USDT and USDC deposit tokens, described as aTokens in the report.
Reental exploit followed an administrative upgrade
Blockaid said an administrator upgraded proxy contracts associated with the stablecoin tokens.
The new implementation reportedly allowed anyone to drain the underlying assets.
That makes the Reental incident fundamentally different from K3 Capital’s economic manipulation exploit.
The key issue appears to be privileged administrative control.
Remaining stablecoins were swept out
After the upgrade, the remaining stablecoin balances were reportedly transferred out.
Blockaid said around $454,000 had been drained across two transactions at the time of its alert.
The firm also identified the relevant exploit address and affected smart contracts.
Proxy upgrades can be extremely powerful
Upgradeable smart contracts commonly use proxy patterns.
The proxy holds state and user balances.
An administrator can change the implementation contract containing the logic.
That flexibility allows developers to fix bugs or add features.
But it also creates a major security dependency.
A compromised admin key can bypass normal contract protections
If an attacker gains access to an administrative upgrade key, they may not need to exploit the existing code.
They can replace it.
A malicious implementation can then:
- Change transfer rules
- Bypass access controls
- Drain funds
- Grant new permissions
That is why admin key security is often as important as smart contract code security.
The source does not establish how the admin upgrade was authorized
The report says an administrator upgraded the contracts.
It does not establish whether the cause was:
- A stolen admin key
- A compromised multisig
- An insider action
- Another governance failure
That question remains open.
Reental operates tokenized real estate products
Reental is a blockchain-based real estate investment platform.
Its documentation describes products involving tokenized loans and shares linked to properties in Spain and the United States.
That means stablecoin contracts can play an important role in moving investor funds through the platform.
The two exploits involve very different security failures
K3 Capital’s incident appears to involve economic and accounting logic.
Reental’s appears tied to privileged contract administration.
That distinction matters because the defensive measures are different.
For K3, the focus is on:
- Vault accounting
- Liquidation logic
- Flash-loan resistance
For Reental, the focus is on:
- Admin key security
- Multisig controls
- Upgrade restrictions
- Monitoring
Both incidents were described as ongoing
Blockaid said both attacks were still ongoing when it issued its alerts.
That means the initial loss figures could potentially change.
The reported amounts should therefore be treated as snapshots rather than guaranteed final totals.
November has seen several DeFi security incidents
The K3 and Reental losses came amid a broader run of crypto exploits during November.
Other incidents cited in the source include:
- Kava Lend
- A Gnosis Safe wallet
- Curve Finance
The combined pattern highlights continued pressure on DeFi security.
Kava Lend lost about $3.76 million
Earlier in the week, a Kava Lend exploit resulted in approximately $3.76 million in losses at pre-attack valuations.
The attacker reportedly exploited an accounting weakness in a dormant BUSD lending market.
That case also involved a financial logic problem rather than a simple private key theft.
A Gnosis Safe wallet reportedly lost $6.45 million
A separate wallet using Gnosis Safe reportedly lost $6.45 million in a suspected exploit involving previously configured transaction permissions.
That case shows that multisig wallets are not automatically safe if dangerous permissions have already been established.
Curve Finance lost administrative revenue
Curve Finance also disclosed a smaller incident involving approximately $38,200.
Attackers reportedly exploited a vulnerability in a fee conversion contract through 138 unauthorized trades.
Curve said user deposits and lending markets were not affected.
Curve is replacing the vulnerable fee conversion design
A governance proposal was opened to replace the affected fee conversion contract with an auction-based system.
That is another example of how protocols often respond to exploits by changing architecture rather than only patching one line of code.
Why vault accounting is so sensitive
Vaults issue shares representing a claim on pooled assets.
To do that safely, the protocol must know the true value of the assets in the pool.
If the share price is calculated incorrectly, users can:
- Deposit too cheaply
- Withdraw too much
- Dilute existing users
That is exactly why valuation bugs can become extremely damaging.
Liquidation proceeds must be counted correctly
A vault can hold more than just the original deposit asset.
After liquidations, it may receive collateral.
If that collateral is not included properly in the vault’s net asset value, the share price can become wrong.
An attacker can then exploit the mismatch between actual assets and accounting value.
Self-liquidation can create adversarial conditions
A normal user might not intentionally manipulate liquidation timing.
An attacker will.
A secure DeFi protocol needs to assume that users may deliberately trigger edge cases if doing so creates profit.
That is why economic attack modeling is critical.
Flash loans remove capital constraints
Without flash loans, an attacker may need millions of dollars in upfront capital.
With flash loans, the same attack can sometimes be executed using temporary liquidity.
That makes economic vulnerabilities accessible to more attackers.
Protocols need to design assuming large temporary capital can appear instantly.
Admin controls create a different centralization risk
Upgradeable contracts trade immutability for flexibility.
That can be practical.
But it means users are trusting whoever controls the upgrade mechanism.
If one compromised key can change the contract logic immediately, the system can have a major single point of failure.
Timelocks can reduce upgrade risk
One common defense is an upgrade timelock.
Instead of allowing new contract code to become active immediately, the change waits for a defined period.
That gives:
- Users
- Security researchers
- Monitoring systems
time to review the upgrade before it takes effect.
It does not eliminate risk, but it reduces the danger of instant malicious upgrades.
Multisigs can also help
Requiring several independent signers to approve an upgrade can reduce the risk from one stolen key.
However, multisigs only help when:
- Signers are independent
- Devices are secure
- Thresholds are appropriate
A compromised group of signers can still authorize a malicious upgrade.
Monitoring upgrade events is critical
Security systems can watch blockchain events for:
- Proxy upgrades
- Admin changes
- Ownership transfers
- Emergency permissions
An unexpected upgrade to a contract holding significant funds should trigger immediate scrutiny.
Early detection can limit losses if users or operators can react quickly.
DeFi investors need to assess more than code audits
Users often focus on whether a protocol has been audited.
That is only one part of the risk picture.
Other questions include:
- Is the contract upgradeable?
- Who controls admin keys?
- Is there a timelock?
- Are vault prices oracle-dependent?
- Can flash loans influence accounting?
- What happens during liquidation?
Architecture matters as much as audit logos.
Third-party integrations can widen attack surfaces
The K3 incident also shows that using a well-known underlying protocol does not remove risk.
A third-party vault can introduce its own:
- Accounting
- Automation
- Token
- Strategy logic
Users are exposed to that additional layer.
A secure base protocol does not guarantee every application built on top is equally secure.
Stablecoin assets are not protected from smart contract exploits
Both incidents involved stablecoin-denominated value.
Stablecoins reduce price volatility.
They do not reduce smart contract risk.
A contract holding USDC or USDT can still be drained if its logic or permissions are compromised.
What K3 Capital users should watch
Key areas include:
Post-mortem:
The exact root cause needs to be established.
Vault status:
Whether deposits, withdrawals or redemptions remain paused matters.
Recovery:
Any frozen or recoverable funds could reduce final losses.
Audit comparison:
Researchers will likely compare the exploit with the 2025 self-liquidation finding.
What Reental users should watch
Important questions include:
Admin key status:
Was the upgrade authority compromised?
Contract control:
Can further upgrades still occur?
Stablecoin recovery:
Have any destination addresses been frozen?
Governance changes:
Reental may need stronger upgrade controls after the incident.
Exchanges and stablecoin issuers may assist recovery
If stolen USDT or USDC reaches centralized venues, exchanges may be able to freeze accounts after receiving valid legal or security requests.
Stablecoin issuers may also have technical mechanisms to freeze certain assets under specific circumstances.
Whether that happens depends on the facts and legal process.
On-chain tracing starts immediately
Blockchain security firms can follow attacker wallets and identify:
- Swaps
- Bridges
- Exchange deposits
- Mixer interactions
Public blockchains provide significant visibility.
That does not guarantee recovery, but it can improve the chances if the attacker eventually uses a centralized service.
What to watch next
Final loss totals:
Both exploits were described as ongoing when reported.
K3 root cause:
A technical report should clarify whether the old self-liquidation risk was involved.
Reental upgrade authority:
The source of the malicious administrative action remains important.
Fund recovery:
Any freezes or negotiated returns could reduce losses.
Protocol changes:
Both platforms may introduce new accounting or admin safeguards.
Final thoughts
The K3 Capital and Reental exploits show how different DeFi security failures can lead to the same outcome: user funds leaving smart contracts.
K3 Capital’s roughly $3.43 million loss appears to involve a sophisticated economic attack in which flash loans and self-liquidations distorted the value of sBOLD vault shares.
Reental’s roughly $454,000 incident appears much more direct, with an administrative upgrade allegedly replacing contract logic in a way that allowed underlying stablecoins to be drained.
The incidents also reinforce why DeFi security cannot be reduced to one question about whether a contract was audited.
K3’s earlier audit had already examined self-liquidation and share valuation risks.
Reental’s case highlights the separate danger created by upgrade authority.
Users need to understand both the code and the control structure around that code.
For now, the combined reported losses stand near $3.9 million, but because both exploits were described as ongoing at the time of disclosure, the final impact may still change.
Disclosure: This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice.


















































