Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin has urged Canadians to contact lawmakers over Bill C-22, warning that the proposed legislation could weaken protections around end-to-end encryption.
In a November 17 post on X, Buterin compared the Canadian debate with the European Union’s controversial “Chat Control” discussions and called for encryption protections that do not rely on hidden exceptions or technical backdoors.
Bill C-22, formally known as the Lawful Access Act, 2026, has not yet become law.
The House of Commons passed the legislation in June, but it remains under Senate review after second reading in October.
The debate now centers on how far the government should be able to require technology providers to build lawful-access capabilities without undermining the security of encrypted systems.
Vitalik Buterin urges Canadians to contact senators
Buterin said Canada was facing its own version of Europe’s encryption debate.
He urged Canadians to make their views known to senators and argued that strong end-to-end encryption is important to maintaining a secure, open and free society.
His comments focused particularly on the danger of creating technical access mechanisms that could later be abused.
Buterin calls for backdoor-free encryption
The Ethereum co-founder argued that governments should minimize both technical backdoors and broad data collection.
He linked that concern to the growing role of artificial intelligence in cybersecurity.
As AI systems become more capable, weaknesses deliberately introduced into encrypted systems could potentially become easier for malicious actors to discover or exploit.
Bill C-22 remains in the Senate
The legislation is still moving through Parliament.
The House of Commons passed Bill C-22 on June 18, 2026.
The Senate approved second reading on October 22 and referred the bill to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs.
The bill still needs to move through:
- Committee review
- Report stage
- Third reading
- Royal assent
before becoming law.
Senate committee is hearing from privacy and technology experts
The committee held a hearing on November 16 involving representatives from Meta, Signal, privacy groups and legal experts.
Those hearings are important because they allow senators to examine how the legislation could affect encryption, privacy and technology businesses.
Committee review can also produce amendments before the bill moves further.
Bill C-22 would create lawful-access obligations
Part 2 of the legislation would allow the government to require electronic service providers to develop and maintain certain technical capabilities for lawful access.
However, issuing such an order would not itself give authorities unrestricted access to private data.
Investigators would still need the appropriate legal authority before obtaining protected information.
That distinction is central to the government’s defense of the legislation.
The bill does not explicitly require every provider to break end-to-end encryption
The House-passed text contains protections around encrypted data.
It says providers cannot be required to decrypt information encrypted by a customer if the provider does not possess the information needed to unlock it.
That is particularly relevant to true end-to-end encrypted systems where the service provider does not hold the user’s encryption keys.
Providers that hold the keys face a different situation
The protection is narrower when the provider itself supplies the encryption and possesses the information needed to decrypt the data.
In those cases, the law could create different obligations.
That distinction is one reason the technical design of a service matters.
Two products may both describe themselves as encrypted while operating very differently behind the scenes.
Systemic vulnerabilities are also addressed
The legislation also says providers should not be forced to introduce a systemic vulnerability.
Nor should they be prevented from fixing one.
That language is intended to stop lawful-access orders from requiring security weaknesses that could endanger every user of a service.
However, critics argue that the definition of a systemic vulnerability may not fully resolve the problem.
The definition contains an important limitation
Under the House-passed text, a vulnerability affecting only people covered by a warrant or another legal authorization may not qualify as a systemic vulnerability.
Privacy advocates are concerned that this distinction could leave room for targeted technical mechanisms that still weaken security in practice.
That is one of the areas likely to receive continued scrutiny in the Senate.
Core provider categories remain undefined
Another significant issue is that the schedule identifying core electronic service providers is currently blank.
Those categories would be filled through future regulations.
That means some of the most important questions about who is covered have not yet been fully answered in the legislation itself.
Core providers could face metadata retention duties
Providers placed in the core category could be required to retain certain metadata for up to six months.
Metadata can include information such as:
- Date
- Time
- Duration
- Origin
- Destination
The legislation does not authorize mandatory retention of message content, browsing history or social-media activity under that provision.
Metadata can still reveal a great deal
Even without message content, metadata can provide significant information about a person’s activities.
It can reveal:
- Who communicates with whom
- When conversations happen
- How often they occur
- Where certain activity originates
That is why privacy advocates often treat metadata retention as a significant surveillance issue in its own right.
Public safety minister would have broad order powers
The public safety minister could issue orders to electronic service providers beyond those explicitly designated as core providers.
These orders could impose technical obligations or metadata-related requirements.
They could last for up to two years.
The orders would also require approval from the Intelligence Commissioner.
Providers would be allowed to make representations
The legislation provides affected companies with an opportunity to make representations before certain orders are finalized.
That creates some procedural protection.
However, the law also limits public disclosure of those orders.
Critics argue that secrecy around technical demands can make external oversight more difficult.
Crypto services could potentially fall within the definition
Bill C-22 defines electronic service providers broadly.
The language covers organizations that create, store, process, transmit, receive or make electronic information available while serving people in Canada or doing business there.
That could potentially include some crypto businesses.
However, the bill does not specifically name crypto exchanges, wallet providers or self-custody applications.
Centralized exchanges are more likely to fit the definition
A centralized crypto exchange serving Canadian customers could plausibly fall within the provider definition because it:
- Stores account data
- Processes transactions
- Maintains customer records
- Provides electronic services
The same may apply to hosted wallet providers.
But the exact legal treatment would depend on how the service operates.
Self-custody wallets raise a different question
A self-custody wallet may not hold a user’s private keys or have any ability to decrypt wallet data.
That makes its position materially different from a centralized platform.
The decryption protections in Bill C-22 could therefore be important for wallet developers that genuinely lack access to user secrets.
The bill does not require wallet developers to hold private keys
Nothing in the legislation expressly requires developers of self-custody wallets to take possession of user private keys.
That is an important distinction.
The legislation is about technical capabilities and lawful access, not a direct mandate that every crypto wallet become custodial.
Whether a specific wallet or privacy application would fall within the regime depends on its design.
Ottawa says legal authorization would still be required
The Canadian government says Bill C-22 would not create direct government access to company systems.
Investigators would still need appropriate legal authorization before requesting personal information.
The legislation is therefore framed as improving lawful-access capabilities rather than eliminating judicial or statutory safeguards.
Critics remain concerned about what technical capabilities providers may have to build in order to comply.
Mozilla says exceptional access cannot be made perfectly safe
Mozilla has argued that creating exceptional access to encrypted data inherently creates security risks.
Its concern is that a mechanism designed for authorized access could eventually be abused by attackers, foreign governments or other unauthorized actors.
The organization has warned that companies could potentially be required to create systems that bypass existing privacy protections.
Pre-encryption access is another concern
A system does not necessarily need to decrypt a message after transmission in order to access its contents.
A device could potentially capture information before encryption occurs.
Privacy advocates therefore argue that legislation should protect not only encrypted data in transit but also the technical safeguards that prevent access before or after encryption.
Privacy Commissioner welcomed some amendments
Canadian Privacy Commissioner Philippe Dufresne acknowledged improvements to the legislation.
He specifically welcomed amendments preventing requirements to decrypt true end-to-end encrypted information.
However, he argued that further safeguards are still needed.
Commissioner calls for necessity and proportionality tests
Dufresne recommended clearer limits on access to subscriber information.
He also called for obligations to meet necessity and proportionality standards.
That would require authorities to show that an order is not only useful but appropriately limited to the circumstances.
Such tests are common in privacy and surveillance law.
UN Human Rights Office also raised concerns
The UN Human Rights Office warned that Bill C-22 could undermine end-to-end encryption.
It recommended stronger language explicitly protecting critical technical safeguards.
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has cited those concerns while calling for further amendments.
Critics want stronger wording rather than implied protection
One of the central disputes is whether the bill’s current protections are sufficiently explicit.
Supporters point to the provisions against mandatory decryption and systemic vulnerabilities.
Critics argue that technical access requirements could still weaken privacy even without directly ordering a provider to decrypt messages.
The Senate debate is therefore focused heavily on how the safeguards are written.
Buterin compared the debate to the EU’s Chat Control fight
Buterin’s comparison with Europe refers to the long-running debate around EU proposals for detecting child sexual abuse material online.
Those proposals have generated controversy over whether private communications should be scanned.
Encryption has been one of the most contentious issues.
The EU comparison is not exact
Canada’s Bill C-22 and the EU proposals are not the same law.
The European debate focuses heavily on detecting and reporting child sexual abuse material.
Bill C-22 focuses on lawful-access capabilities and telecommunications-related obligations.
Both raise questions about encryption, but they use different legal structures.
EU negotiations remain unresolved
The European Union has not reached final agreement on the most controversial permanent detection rules.
A temporary measure allowing voluntary detection remains in force until April 3, 2028.
According to EU guidance cited in the source, that temporary framework excludes end-to-end encrypted communications.
That further limits how directly the Canadian and European proposals can be compared.
Buterin has made privacy a recurring priority
Buterin’s opposition to potential encryption backdoors fits with his broader focus on privacy technologies.
He has previously discussed privacy-focused artificial intelligence agents using Tor and zero-knowledge systems.
The Ethereum Foundation has also supported efforts to make wallet privacy more accessible by default.
Ethereum Foundation has backed privacy tooling
The foundation has supported Kohaku, a software development kit aimed at improving default wallet privacy.
That effort reflects a broader Ethereum ecosystem push toward privacy without abandoning verifiability.
Privacy tooling is increasingly seen as important as more financial and personal activity moves on-chain.
Buterin has also funded private messaging projects
In December 2025, Buterin allocated 256 ETH to privacy-focused messaging projects Session and SimpleX Chat.
That funding demonstrates that his concern about encryption goes beyond blockchain transactions.
He has consistently argued that private digital communication is a fundamental part of online freedom.
Why AI changes the cybersecurity argument
Buterin specifically linked the encryption debate to AI.
AI can improve defensive cybersecurity.
But it can also help attackers:
- Find software vulnerabilities
- Automate phishing
- Analyze leaked data
- Scale exploitation
That makes intentionally introduced weaknesses more dangerous over time.
A lawful backdoor can become an unlawful backdoor
The core concern raised by encryption advocates is simple.
A technical mechanism does not necessarily know whether the person using it is authorized.
If a system contains a hidden access route, attackers may eventually discover or steal access to it.
That is why many cryptographers oppose creating universal decryption capabilities.
Governments face a competing law-enforcement concern
Law enforcement agencies argue that encryption can make legitimate investigations harder.
Even with a warrant, authorities may be unable to obtain readable information if neither the service provider nor government possesses the key.
That creates tension between privacy and investigative capability.
Bill C-22 is an attempt to address part of that problem.
The debate is about technical capability, not only legal authority
Authorities may already have legal authority to request information under certain circumstances.
The challenge is whether the provider technically possesses the information or can produce it.
A warrant is of limited value if the data cannot be decrypted.
The debate therefore centers on whether governments should be able to require companies to build technical capabilities in advance.
Crypto companies have additional concerns
For crypto services, technical access obligations can create unique problems.
A centralized exchange may hold customer data and transaction information.
A self-custody wallet may intentionally lack access to keys.
Forcing every service into the same technical model could undermine the design principles behind self-custody.
That is why the broad provider definition deserves close attention from the crypto sector.
Private keys are different from ordinary account data
A crypto private key gives control over blockchain assets.
If a government or service provider gains access to the key, that is more than access to information.
It can potentially allow transactions.
Nothing in the source suggests Bill C-22 expressly requires wallet providers to collect or surrender user private keys, but the distinction remains important when evaluating future regulations.
Future regulations could determine the practical impact
Because the core-provider list remains unfinished, much of the real-world effect will depend on regulations adopted later.
Those rules could determine:
- Which businesses are covered
- Which metadata must be retained
- What technical capabilities are required
- Which exemptions apply
This means the final legislation is only part of the regulatory picture.
Senate amendments could still change the bill
Because Bill C-22 remains in committee, its final language is not fixed.
Senators can recommend amendments.
The House would then need to agree with any changes before the legislation could move toward royal assent.
That gives privacy advocates and technology companies another opportunity to influence the text.
Contacting senators could still matter procedurally
Buterin’s call for Canadians to contact senators comes at a stage when the legislation is still being examined.
The committee has not completed its work.
That makes public input more relevant than it would be after final enactment.
However, the eventual effect depends on how lawmakers respond.
Bill C-22 is not yet law
This point is especially important.
The legislation has advanced substantially, but it has not completed the parliamentary process.
The current rules therefore remain proposals rather than operative obligations under Bill C-22.
Companies and users should distinguish the House-passed text from final law.
What to watch next
Senate committee amendments:
Changes to encryption protections could determine the bill’s final privacy impact.
Core-provider definitions:
Future regulations will clarify which companies face the strongest obligations.
Crypto coverage:
Guidance could show whether exchanges, hosted wallets or privacy tools are specifically included.
Metadata limits:
Further amendments could narrow how subscriber and transaction metadata is retained.
Royal assent:
The legislation will not become law until it completes the full parliamentary process.
Final thoughts
Vitalik Buterin’s intervention has brought additional attention to Canada’s Bill C-22 at a crucial stage of the legislative process.
His concern is not simply that authorities may gain lawful access to data.
It is that technology providers could be pressured to build technical capabilities that weaken encryption for everyone.
The House-passed version already contains important safeguards.
It does not generally require providers to decrypt customer-encrypted information when they do not possess the necessary keys, and it prohibits requirements that introduce systemic vulnerabilities.
But critics including Mozilla, Canada’s Privacy Commissioner and the UN Human Rights Office argue that those protections should go further.
For crypto users, the implications remain uncertain.
Centralized exchanges and hosted wallets could potentially fit within the legislation’s broad definition of electronic service providers, while genuinely self-custodial systems may be differently situated because developers do not control user keys.
The next phase of Senate review will determine whether the bill’s encryption safeguards are strengthened before it advances.
Until then, Bill C-22 remains a proposal under active debate—not a finalized requirement for Canadian technology or crypto companies.


















































